Breaking the prejudice habit: Mechanisms, timecourse, and longevity by Forscher, Patrick S. et al.
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Psychological Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations Psychological Science
4-25-2017
Breaking the prejudice habit: Mechanisms,
timecourse, and longevity
Patrick S. Forscher
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, forscher@uark.edu
Chelsea Mitamura
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Emily L. Dix
University of Wisconsin-Madison
William T.L. Cox
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Patricia G. Devine
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/psycpub
Part of the Human Factors Psychology Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons,
and the Social Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychological Science at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Psychological Science Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please
contact ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Forscher, Patrick S.; Mitamura, Chelsea; Dix, Emily L.; Cox, William T.L.; and Devine, Patricia G., "Breaking the prejudice habit:
Mechanisms, timecourse, and longevity" (2017). Psychological Science Faculty Publications and Presentations. 6.
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/psycpub/6
Running head: HABIT-BREAKING MECHANISMS                  1 
 
 
 
Breaking the prejudice habit: Mechanisms, timecourse, and longevity 
April 25, 2017 
In press, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
  
Patrick S. Forscher1, Chelsea Mitamura1, Emily L. Dix1,  
William T. L. Cox1, and Patricia G. Devine1 
 
1Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin – Madison 
  
Authors’ notes: 
Data and materials for this project can be found at https://osf.io/a3c8h/ 
 
Address correspondence to Patrick S. Forscher (Email: schnarrd@gmail.com) and/or Patricia G. 
Devine (Email: pgdevine@wisc.edu). 
 
Conceived research: Forscher, Devine; Designed research: Forscher, Mitamura, Devine; 
Coordinated data collection: Forscher, Mitamura; Coded free response data: Forscher, Mitamura, 
Dix; Analyzed data: Forscher, Dix; Wrote paper: all authors; Revised paper: all authors. 
 
Preparation of this article was supported by NIH grant 5R01GM111002-02, a Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation Professorship awarded to the last author, and a National Science 
Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (DGE-1256259) awarded to the third author. 
 
We’d like to thank Maha Baalbaki, Brittany Drifka, Collin Eckberg, Hannah Kimyon, Keith 
Knutson, Alyssa Law, Tianrui Li, Mary Martinco, Ryan Massopust, Kelly Nance, Nicole Sather, 
and Zach Wittrock for their help collecting data for this study.  
  
Running head: HABIT-BREAKING MECHANISMS                  2 
 
Abstract 
The prejudice habit-breaking intervention (Devine et al., 2012) and its offshoots (e.g., 
Carnes et al., 2012) have shown promise in effecting long-term change in key outcomes related 
to intergroup bias, including increases in awareness, concern about discrimination, and, in one 
study, long-term decreases in implicit bias. This intervention is based on the premise that 
unintentional bias is like a habit that can be broken with sufficient motivation, awareness, and 
effort. We conducted replication of the original habit-breaking intervention experiment in a 
sample more than three times the size of the original (N = 292).  We also measured all outcomes 
every other day for 14 days and measured potential mechanisms for the intervention’s effects. 
Consistent with previous results, the habit-breaking intervention produced a change in concern 
that endured two weeks post-intervention.  These effects were associated with increased 
sensitivity to the biases of others and an increased tendency to label biases as wrong.  
Contrasting with the original work, both control and intervention participants decreased in 
implicit bias, and the effects of the habit-breaking intervention on awareness declined in the 
second week of the study.  In a subsample recruited two years later, intervention participants 
were more likely than control participants to object on a public online forum to an essay 
endorsing racial stereotyping. Our results suggest that the habit-breaking intervention produces 
enduring changes in peoples’ knowledge of and beliefs about race-related issues, and we argue 
that these changes are even more important for promoting long-term behavioral change than are 
changes in implicit bias. 
Keywords: intervention; implicit bias; social cognition; replication 
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Breaking the prejudice habit: Mechanisms, timecourse, and longevity 
 Intergroup inequality is a ubiquitous problem, with minorities facing disparities in a 
variety of consequential domains, from the allocation of medical care (Williams, Neighbors, & 
Jackson, 2003) to hiring (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2007). One potential contributor to these 
problems is implicit bias.  Theorized to influence behavior despite countervailing intentions 
(Devine, 1989), implicit bias has attracted attention precisely because it has the potential to cause 
otherwise fair-minded people to be unwittingly complicit in the perpetuation of inequality.  The 
specter of unintentional discrimination has inspired widespread calls from researchers, scholars, 
and public policy officials to develop effective interventions to reduce and eliminate the negative 
effects of unintentional bias (e.g., Fiske, 1998; Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2003). Revealing the 
scope of the response to this call, a recent meta-analysis uncovered 573 experiments testing 
methods to change implicit bias (Forscher, Lai, et al., under review). Though many interventions 
reduced implicit bias, very few (6.6% of the meta-analytic samples) have been tested over time.  
Solving social problems requires interventions that produce changes that endure. 
The prejudice habit-breaking intervention contrasts with many of these other 
interventions in that it was explicitly developed to produce enduring change (Devine, Forscher, 
Austin, & Cox, 2012; see also Carnes et al., 2012). The habit-breaking intervention is based on 
the prejudice habit model (Devine, 1989), which proposes that enduring change in biases, such 
as implicit bias, that occur unintentionally can be achieved by treating unintentional bias as an 
unwanted habit that can be broken through a combination of motivation, awareness, and effort. 
This multifaceted intervention was designed to address a number of common stumbling blocks 
on the path to change. Specifically, although many people feel motivated to overcome biases in 
their behavior (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 
Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998), they are not always aware of 
their biases (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001), nor do they always know how to 
productively channel their motivation into behavior that will help overcome bias (Apfelbaum, 
Sommers, & Norton, 2008; Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). In some cases, 
the threat of behaving with bias may even lead people to avoid members of minority groups in an 
effort to prevent the possibility of biased behavior and the negative feelings that follow (Stephan 
& Stephan, 1985; Plant & Devine, 2003).  
Using a semi-interactive slide show, the prejudice habit-breaking intervention navigates 
people around these stumbling blocks by providing education about the existence, origins, and 
consequences of unintentional bias, and teaching them evidence-based strategies to overcome 
bias. This presentation provokes awareness by giving participants feedback about their own level 
of implicit bias, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). The presentation then teaches them how implicit bias can lead to unintentional 
but consequential discriminatory behavior, leading to negative consequences for racial 
minorities. Finally, it provides recipients with evidence-based, cognitive strategies that, if 
practiced, can lead to bias reduction (i.e., stereotype replacement, perspective taking, 
individuation, counterstereotypic imaging, and increasing opportunities for contact). These 
strategies give participants productive ways of channeling their behavior into effective solutions 
that they can implement independently to reduce their bias over time. In a randomized controlled 
trial, Devine and colleagues demonstrated that the habit-breaking intervention produced long-
term changes in key outcomes, including reduced IAT bias, increased concern about 
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discrimination, and greater reported beliefs that there could be bias present in their thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors. These changes endured two months following the intervention. 
 The long-term effects of the habit-breaking intervention were both exciting and 
encouraging, suggesting that this intervention might be an effective tool in our efforts to more 
broadly address sources of persistent social inequality. Before it can fulfill this role, however, we 
must know how the effects occur, whether they replicate, whether they last longer than two 
months, and whether they generalize to consequential behaviors. The present work was 
developed to address these questions. Specifically, we conducted a new experiment to replicate 
the habit-breaking intervention’s effects on implicit bias, concern, and awareness in a larger 
sample of participants. We further assessed some potential mechanisms of the intervention’s 
effects and examined the extent to which the intervention affected behavior two years later.  
With these objectives in mind, we evaluated the effects of the habit-breaking intervention 
in a two-phase design. In the first phase, we randomly assigned participants to intervention and 
control conditions and measured a set of outcomes every other day for two weeks. Specifically, 
every two days, we collected measures of: (1) implicit bias, (2) concern about discrimination, (3) 
discrepancies between participants’ standards for and beliefs about their interracial behavior, and 
(4) several potential mechanisms for the intervention’s effects: the quantity and content of race-
related thoughts, race-related conversations, and cross-race interactions with Black people. 
Participants in the intervention condition were also asked whether and how they used the bias-
reduction strategies learned during the intervention. We chose this frequent assessment schedule 
so that we could obtain stable estimates of the intervention’s effects, assess trajectories of 
change, and assess the relationships between change processes. In the second phase, we invited 
these same participants to complete an ostensibly unrelated study two years later. Phase 2 
contained key measures from Phase 1, as well as three behaviors that could plausibly be affected 
by the habit-breaking intervention. 
Phase 1 
Method 
 All materials, data, and supplemental analyses are publicly available at 
https://osf.io/a3c8h/. 
Participants. In Phase 1, 302 non-Black students in Introductory Psychology were 
randomly assigned to intervention (N = 138) and control (N = 164) conditions. We aimed to 
obtain a much larger sample size than Devine and colleagues by recruiting as many participants 
as possible over the course of two semesters.  Of the initial 302 participants, four from the 
control condition were eliminated prior to analysis because they mistakenly received follow-ups 
designed for the intervention group (referencing the bias-reduction strategies). An additional six 
participants were eliminated because, on multiple occasions our measure of implicit bias, they 
had mean reaction times below 400 ms and/or mean accuracies below 70%, suggesting a lack of 
task attention. These eliminations resulted in a total of 292 participants (136 intervention, 156 
control; 68% female, 67% White, 25% Asian) who were eligible for analysis, more than three 
times the sample of 91 used by Devine and colleagues (2012). 
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Procedure.  As shown in Figure 1, our procedure was highly similar to that used by 
Devine and colleagues (2012), with six differences that are shown in Table 1 and described in 
more detail below.  At the beginning of the semester, we measured baseline concern and 
discrepancies between standards and beliefs as part of a large online survey.  The online survey 
also contained measures of attitudes toward Black people and the internal and external 
motivations for responding without prejudice (IMS and EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998), which we 
included to ensure equivalence between experimental conditions on these dimensions at baseline. 
We allowed participants to enroll in the study between two weeks and two months after the 
completion of the large online survey.  
Figure 1.  Study timeline. 
 
 
Table 1.  Differences in procedure between Devine et al. (2012) and the current study. 
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Participants completed the first session in the lab in groups of one to six. Each group was 
randomly assigned to condition.1 All participants were then asked to complete our measure of 
implicit bias, the Black-White evaluative Implicit Association Test (IAT). After the IAT, control 
participants received feedback about their IAT scores, completed a measure of affect that is not 
discussed further, and were dismissed.  The IAT feedback and affect measure were included to 
match the design of Devine et al. (2012), who sought to establish that feedback alone is 
insufficient to achieve the habit-breaking intervention’s effects. Participants in the intervention 
condition completed the narrated, semi-interactive slideshow that constitutes the prejudice habit-
breaking intervention. Embedded in this slideshow was feedback about their IAT score and the 
same affect measure given to control participants. To encourage participants to pay close 
attention to the content of intervention, they were told that we were considering adapting the 
intervention for use with high school students.  Ostensibly because “high school students look up 
to college students,” participants were told that after they viewed the slideshow, they would be 
asked to write an essay about the possible benefits of the slideshow content for high school 
students. To help prepare for this essay, intervention participants were given a pen and paper to 
take notes during the intervention. In the essay, they were allowed to write as little or as much as 
they wished and were encouraged to cover the major points that were presented during the 
slideshow. Devine and colleagues (2012) did not include this essay as a part of the intervention.  
We added this essay as both a potential measure and because of evidence that self-generated 
messages can enhance the effect of psychological interventions (Canning & Harackiewicz, 2015; 
see also Janis & King, 1954; Cialdini & Petty, 1981).  However, adding this essay has the 
limitation of making this particular instantiation of the habit-breaking intervention less 
transportable to other contexts.  Although we coded the content of the essays, we do not present 
the coding scheme and results here because there was too little variation in the coding categories 
for analyses to be meaningful.  Nevertheless, the essay coding scheme and results involving the 
coding categories are presented in full at https://osf.io/a3c8h/. 
A link to a follow-up survey was emailed to participants every other evening for two 
weeks following the in-lab study. Relative to the procedure used by Devine and colleagues 
(2012), we shortened the study duration and increased the number and frequency of the follow-
ups to obtain a more focused snapshot of the trajectory of change in the study outcomes. We 
chose a study duration of two weeks and measurement lag of two days to provide a balance 
between participant burden and measurement frequency. The follow-up survey contained 
measures of (1) implicit bias, (2) concern about discrimination, (3) discrepancies between 
standards for and beliefs about one’s interracial behavior, and (4) frequencies and content of 
race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial interactions involving Black 
people. Participants assigned to the intervention group also answered questions about each of the 
five strategies taught during the intervention. They were asked to report how often they used 
each of the strategies over the past two days using an 8-point scale ranging from “0 times” to “7 
or more times”, and to briefly describe a situation in which they used the strategy. If participants 
                                                          
1 Because participants did not interact with one another in the sessions, there is no a priori reason to believe that 
there would be interdependence among outcomes at the session level. The random assignment of sessions rather 
than participants to conditions, however, makes this a cluster-randomized trial. We examined whether there was 
evidence of within-session interdependence by calculating the session ICC for the IAT, concern, discrepancies, 
shoulds, and woulds.  For the IAT, concern, and woulds, the ICC was effectively 0.  For woulds and discrepancies, 
the ICC was small (woulds ICC = .008, discrepancies ICC = .069).  We therefore treated our design as if 
randomization occurred at the participant level throughout the paper.  
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missed a survey, they were still encouraged to complete the remaining surveys. Across 
conditions, participants completed an average of 4.79 (SD = 1.75) of the 7 follow-ups. There was 
no evidence of a differential response rate across conditions (intervention M = 4.90, SD = 1.64, 
control M = 4.70, SD = 1.84, Mdiff = .20, 95% CI = [-.21, .60]. 
Implicit Association Test and feedback. We measured implicit bias using the Black-
White evaluative IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a dual 
categorization task in which people categorize sequentially presented stimuli. In the Black-White 
evaluative IAT, the participants categorize pictures of Black and White people and pleasant and 
unpleasant words as to their race and valence, respectively. The assumption underlying the IAT 
is that people should perform the task faster when concepts that are associated in memory (i.e., 
Black people with negative words and White people with positive words) are paired on the same 
response key (compatible trials) than with the reverse pairings (incompatible trials). Responses 
on compatible and incompatible trials are used to compute D-scores (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003), which are scored such that higher numbers indicate a greater association of White 
with positive and Black with negative than the reverse. Overall, participants showed a moderate 
baseline pro-White bias (baseline M = .35, SD = .34, skew = -.50, rsplit half = .79). Immediately 
following the IAT, control participants were told their IAT D-scores, along with a short 
interpretation of the D-score as to whether it indicated a preference for White people, no 
preference, or a preference for Black people, and whether this preference was strong, moderate, 
or slight (for more details, see Devine et al., 2012). 
Prejudice habit-breaking intervention. Immediately after the IAT, intervention 
participants completed the prejudice habit-breaking intervention. The habit-breaking intervention 
is divided into education and training sections. In the education section, the participants learn 
what implicit bias is, how implicit bias is measured, and the consequences of implicit bias for 
racial minorities. After the education section, the participants received feedback about their 
personal level of implicit bias, which was formatted in a way that was identical to the feedback 
given to the control participants. Whereas Devine and colleagues (2012) gave all participants 
their feedback immediately following the administration of the IAT, we reasoned that the 
feedback would be more meaningful to participants after they learned about the IAT and what it 
is purported to measure. 
In the training section of the intervention, the participants were introduced to the idea that 
implicit bias can be overcome through a combination of motivation, awareness, and the use of 
bias-reduction strategies, and they are taught five such strategies. These strategies were identical 
to the strategies used by Devine and colleagues (2012), which included stereotype replacement 
(Monteith, 1993), counter-stereotypic imaging (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001), individuating 
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), perspective taking (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and 
increasing opportunities for contact (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). To enhance the 
perceived utility of these strategies, immediately after learning about each one, participants were 
asked to generate examples of how they could use the strategy in their own life (Hulleman & 
Harackiewicz, 2009). Participants were informed that the strategies could have synergistic 
effects and that the more they practiced the strategies, the more effective they would be. 
Racial attitudes, IMS, and EMS.   These measures were only assessed in the large 
online survey administered prior to the habit-breaking intervention.  Racial attitudes were 
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assessed using a feelings thermometer, which asks participants to rate how warmly they feel 
toward Black people using a 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm) scale.  The internal and external 
motivations to respond without prejudice (IMS and EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998) measure the 
extent to which people respond without prejudice for internal, value-driven reasons or external, 
normative reasons.  They are assessed with five items each using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 
(strongly agree) scale.  The measures are scored such that higher numbers indicate more positive 
attitudes (M = 76.33, SD = 20.27, skew = -.84), internal motivation (M = 7.31, SD = 1.60, skew = 
-.82, α = .76), and external motivation (M = 4.17, SD = 1.97, skew = .11, α = .81). 
 Concern about discrimination. Concern measures the extent to which a person believes 
discrimination toward Black people is a serious problem in society (Devine et al., 2012). The 
concern scale is composed of 4 items, each of which asks participants to respond to statements 
like “I consider racial discrimination to be a serious social problem” using a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) scale. Items are scored such that higher numbers indicate greater 
concern (baseline M = 6.77, SD = 1.96, skew = -.09, α = .76). 
 Discrepancies between standards and beliefs. The discrepancy scale measures the 
difference between how people believe they should act, think, and feel in a variety of race-
related situations vs. how they actually would act, think, and feel in those same situations 
(Monteith & Voils, 1998; Devine et al., 1991). The discrepancy scale is divided into separate 
should and would subscales.  In the discrepancy scale developed by Monteith and Voils (1998), 
each subscale contained 16 items, each of which was measured using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale. We reduced this number to 6 items on the should and would subscales to 
reduce the scale’s total length. The should index is created by averaging the responses on the six 
should items such that higher scores indicate a greater belief that one should act with bias 
towards Black people (baseline M = 1.65, SD = 1.02, skew = 2.13, α = .88). The would index is 
created by averaging responses on the six would items such that higher scores indicate a greater 
belief that one would act with bias towards Black people (baseline M = 2.45, SD = 1.15, skew = 
.76, α = .84). The discrepancies index is created by subtracting responses on the should index 
from responses on the would index. Higher scores indicate a greater belief that one would act 
with more bias than one believes is appropriate (baseline M = .80, SD = 1.18, skew = -.40, α = 
.76). 
 Race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial interactions.  In 
the follow-up questionnaires (but not at baseline), participants were asked to report, since the last 
follow-up questionnaire, the number of thoughts they had had about Black people or issues 
related to Black people, the number of conversations with others they had had about Black 
people or issues related to Black people, and the number of interactions they had had with Black 
people.  The length of time “since the last survey” was variable; although the study was designed 
to obtain follow-up measurements every other day, not all participants completed every survey. 
The average latency between surveys was slightly longer than 2 days (M = 2.25 days, SD = 1.20 
days).  All questions used an 8-point scale ranging from 0 times to 7 or more times. 
After each question, if the participants reported at least one thought, conversation, or 
interaction, they were asked to describe the situation in one to two sentences.  We coded these 
responses for the content of the race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial 
interactions by reading through them to identify common themes, which we used to develop a 
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coding scheme.  Two people coded each response, and discrepancies between coders were 
resolved through discussion.  We revised the coding criteria of any variables with interrater 
reliabilities below .70 and two new people coded these responses.  The final coding scheme and 
interrater reliabilities are shown in Table 2.2  Due to high overlap in the thought and conversation 
themes, we combined scores on these variables for analysis.  
Table 2.  Free response coding scheme for the short responses to the race-related thought, race-
related conversation, and interracial interaction questions. 
 
 
Results 
Data analytic plan.  The intervention and control groups did not differ on any of the 
variables at baseline (see Table 3), so it appears that random assignment was successful.  We 
conducted all analyses using mixed effects models using lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Waler, 
2015) and made all plots using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009).  We used Linear Mixed Effects 
Models if the outcome was quantitative and Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Models if the 
outcome was not, and obtained confidence intervals using likelihood profiles.  Our use of mixed 
effects has the advantage of using all available information from each participant, thereby 
providing a natural framework for handling missing data as long they are either missing 
completely at random or missing at random (MCAR or MAR; Ibrahim & Molenberghs, 2009).   
For count outcomes, we used a log link in the Poisson family and included an offset for the 
number of days since the last measurement to account for variable spacing between 
measurements.  For dichotomous variables, we used a logit link in the binomial family. 
  
                                                          
2 Five variables were coded but excluded from analyses. Strategy use was excluded because of low interrater 
reliability (κ = .56).   Thoughts and conversations about the study, whether the race-related conversations occurred 
in a structured environment, whether the participants confronted another person about their bias, and whether the 
participants had a negative interracial interaction were excluded because they occurred too infrequently for the 
GLMEM models to converge (study = 60/515, structured = 27/249, confrontation = 2/249, negative = 4/834). 
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Table 3.  Characteristics of the intervention and control groups at baseline. 
 
 
 
Note: The “difference” column represents the mean difference in the outcome and its 95% CI. 
The random effects structure always included a random intercept for each participant.  
We included random slopes for predictors that varied within participants.  When models with 
random slopes did not converge, we removed the correlation between the intercepts and slopes, 
which resulted in convergence in all cases.  We note in each section when we excluded the 
correlations between intercepts and slopes. 
Unless otherwise noted, all models included as predictors the linear and quadratic effects 
of time, as well as indicators for condition and the condition by time interactions.  When time 
was included as a predictor, the model also always contained random slopes for time.  Time was 
scaled such that each unit represents one day.  Thus, in all analyses of the overall effects of the 
intervention, the linear effect of time represents the degree to which the outcome of interest 
changed per day, the quadratic effect of time represents the degree to which the rate of change 
over time was accelerating or decelerating per day, and the interactions between the time 
contrasts and condition represents the difference between the intervention and control groups in 
their rate of change and acceleration/deceleration per day. 
Our analyses in Phase 1 address three issues: (1) replication of Devine et al.’s (2012) key 
findings; (2) examination of people’s race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and 
interracial interactions; and (3) examination of strategy use.  
  
Running head: HABIT-BREAKING MECHANISMS                  1 
 
Replication analyses 
Our first priority was to assess whether we replicated the original test of this intervention. To that end, we examined the 
primary outcomes measured by Devine et al. (2012), which included implicit bias, concern about discrimination, shoulds, woulds, and 
discrepancies. These model results are shown in Figure 2 and Table 4.  
Figure 2.  Changes over time in the intervention and control conditions in IAT scores, concern, and discrepancies (and the 
components of discrepancies, shoulds and woulds).  Envelopes indicate ±1 Wald standard error of the estimate. 
 
 
For many, the most exciting finding from Devine et al. (2012) was that intervention participants, but not control participants, 
showed a sustained decrease in IAT bias over time. We observed a different pattern in the present study. Both intervention and control 
participants decreased an average of .011 IAT units per day, 95% CI = [-.015, -.008] – this pattern did not differ for intervention and 
control participants, b = -.001, 95% CI = [-.008, .006]. 
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Table 4.  Change over time in the IAT, concern, discrepancies, and the components of 
discrepancies, shoulds and woulds. 
 
Note: Estimates and their profile likelihood 95% CIs were derived from LMEMs containing condition, linear time, 
quadratic time, and the interactions between condition and linear/quadratic time.  All models contained a random 
intercept for each participant and random slopes for time and quadratic time. 
Although implicit bias has garnered a tremendous amount of attention, Devine and 
colleagues have long argued that intentional, conscious processes are essential for breaking the 
habit of unintentional bias (Devine, 1989; Devine, et al., 2012; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 
1993; Plant & Devine, 1998; 2009). Our measure of concern about discrimination is one 
indicator of one’s conscious belief that discrimination is a serious problem. In the original article, 
concern significantly increased among intervention but not control participants. We observed the 
same pattern in the present study: linear change in concern was stronger among intervention than 
control participants, b = .030, 95% CI = [.000, .060]. Whereas intervention participants increased 
in concern over time, b = .015, 95% CI = [-.007, .036], control participants decreased, b = -.015, 
95% CI = [-.036, .005]. Our analyses also revealed a quadratic trend such that people tended to 
decrease, then increase in concern over time, b = .0056, 95% CI = [.0012, .0080]. This quadratic 
trend was not different among the intervention and control participants, b = -.0020, 95% CI = [-
.0088, .0049]. 
The difference between people’s reported shoulds and woulds provides an index of 
whether people believe they would act with more bias than their standards permit in interracial 
interactions.  Devine et al. (2012) found that should–would discrepancies increased for 
intervention participants but not control participants, an increase that was driven by change in 
woulds.  As shown in Figure 2, in the present study, we found that although intervention 
participants initially increased in discrepancies, their discrepancies declined back to pre-
intervention levels in the latter parts of the study.  This pattern is revealed by the difference in 
the quadratic trends among intervention and control participants, b = -.007, 95% CI = [-.012, -
.002]; whereas intervention participants showed a quadratic trend of increases followed by 
decreases in discrepancies, b = -.009, 95% CI = [-.012, -.005], control participants did not, b = -
.002, 95% CI = [-.005, .002].  This difference in the quadratic trends for discrepancies was 
driven by a difference in the quadratic trends for woulds; intervention and control participants 
showed the same difference in the quadratic trends for woulds that they did for discrepancies, b = 
-.004, 95% CI = [-.008, .000]. 
Replication analyses – Discussion. In sum, our findings only partially replicate the 
findings of Devine and colleagues (2012).  Although intervention participants increased in 
concern more than control participants, they did not decrease in implicit bias more than control 
participants.  Although intervention participants showed an initial increase in discrepancies 
relative to control participants, this increase faded in the latter part of the study. 
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The reason for the inconsistencies between our results and those reported by Devine and 
colleagues (2012) is unclear.  On the one hand, our sample is more than three times that used by 
Devine and colleagues (2012), suggesting that our results are less susceptible to sampling error.  
The persistent decrease in implicit bias and increase in discrepancies results reported by Devine 
and colleagues could therefore be false positives.  On the other hand, as outlined in Table 1, the 
current study differed from that conducted by Devine and colleagues (2012) in six ways, and 
these differences in procedure could have interfered with the detection of the intervention’s 
effects.  In particular, the frequent follow-up assessment schedule could have induced practice 
effects on the IAT, which may have obscured any true effects of the intervention on implicit bias.  
Frequently responding to questions about race may have made all participants more sensitive to 
racial issues, a sensitivity that could have differentially impacted intervention and control 
participants, perhaps causing the decrease in discrepancies in the latter parts of the study.   
Although the interpretation of our findings on implicit bias and discrepancies is unclear, 
the interpretation of our findings for concern is more straightforward.  The habit-breaking 
intervention appears to have a robust, enduring impact on the degree to which people 
characterize racial discrimination as a problem.  Moreover, some of our other results, reported 
below, suggest that concern may be as important or more important than implicit bias with 
regard to empowering people to take steps to address bias.  We will return to these issues in the 
General Discussion. 
Race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial interactions 
We measured race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial 
interactions as potential mechanisms for the intervention’s effects.  We measured both the 
quantity of these outcomes reported by the participants and the content of these outcomes, as 
coded from the participants’ open-ended descriptions.  We first assessed the effects of the habit-
breaking intervention on the quantity and content of thoughts, conversations, and interactions, 
after which we assessed the relationships between the quantity and content variables and implicit 
bias, concern, and should-would discrepancies. 
The habit-breaking intervention’s effects on quantity and content.  Participants 
reported a relatively small total number of race-related thoughts (M = 3.64, SD = 5.69), race-
related conversations (M = 1.86, SD = 4.00), and interracial interactions (M = 8.13, SD = 8.70) 
over the course of the study.  As shown in Figure 3, there were no differences across the 
intervention and control conditions in the change in the daily reported rate of any of the three 
variables.3  The only effects that we observed were steady decreases in the daily reported rate of 
thoughts b = .871, 95% CI = [.843, .899], conversations b = .890, 95% CI = [.845, .931], and 
interactions b = .895, 95% CI = [.877, .911].  Full results for these models are available at 
https://osf.io/a3c8h/. 
                                                          
3 We did not estimate the correlations between random slopes and random intercepts in these models. 
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Figure 3.  Changes over time in the control and training conditions in the number of reported daily race-related thoughts, race-related 
conversations, and interracial interactions.  Envelopes indicate ±1 Wald standard error of the estimate. 
 
 
Although the habit-breaking intervention did not affect the number of thoughts, conversations, and interactions that occurred 
over the study’s two-week duration, it may have affected what happened during these incidents.  As a reminder, participants only 
described their thoughts, conversations, and interactions when they reported that thoughts, conversations, or interactions had occurred 
since their last survey.  People reported a non-zero number of thoughts, conversations, and interactions a relatively small number of 
times, resulting in a small number of codeable descriptions per person (thoughts M = 1.60, conversations M = .90, interactions M = 
2.86).  We therefore did not investigate time trends in these analyses. 
Intervention participants were more likely to mention an incident in which a coder identified that someone other than the 
participant acted with bias, pcontrol = .032, pintervention = .082,
4 OR = 2.710, 95% CI = [1.227, 6.626].  They were also more likely to label 
biases, whether committed by themselves, someone else, or observed in society, as wrong, pcontrol = .077, pintervention = .171, OR = 
2.468, 95% CI = [1.278, 4.984].  Finally, intervention participants were more likely to mention that their interracial interactions were 
with relative strangers, pcontrol = .058, pintervention = .021, OR = .340, 95% CI = [.117, .913], though the absolute difference in predicted 
probabilities was small.  All other content comparisons between control and intervention participants were non-significant and are 
shown in full at https://osf.io/a3c8h/. 
                                                          
4 These numbers represent predicted values from the GLMEM and therefore cannot be interpreted directly as percentages. 
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Relationships with the main study outcomes.  A predictor measured multiple times for 
each person can be associated with an outcome in two ways (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  First, 
a person’s average level of the predictor – in other words, the variance between people – can be 
associated with the outcome.  Second, a person’s change in the predictor – in other words, the 
variance within people – can be associated with the outcome.  To examine whether these 
components of the quantity of race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial 
interactions were associated with the IAT, concern, should, woulds, and discrepancies, we first 
put the quantity variables on a common metric by dividing them by the amount of time that had 
passed since the last measurement, resulting in rates per day.5 We then constructed indicators of 
between-person variance by finding, for each person, their average daily rates of thoughts, 
conversations, and interactions.  We constructed indicators of within-person change by, for each 
person, subtracting their mean rates from each of their occasion-specific rates (Enders & Tofighi, 
2007).  Finally, we fit separate models, each of which simultaneously predicted each of our 
outcome variables from the between-person and within-person indicators for either thoughts, 
conversations, or interactions. 
Table 5.  The relationships between the quantity and content of race-related thoughts, 
conversations, and interactions and the IAT, concern, discrepancies, and the components of 
discrepancies, shoulds and woulds. 
 
 
 
Note: The quantity variables were calculated by dividing the reported quantities of race-related thoughts and 
conversations and interracial interactions and dividing by the elapsed time since the last measurement of these 
variables.  We used each participant’s average rate of change and the differences between their average rate and 
their occasion-specific rates as predictors in an LMEM, with random slopes for the centered occasion-specific rates.  
For the content variables, we calculated the proportion of each participant’s descriptions that were coded in each 
category and used these proportions as predictors in an LMEM.  All 95% CIs were derived using profile likelihood.  
All models contained effects for condition, linear and quadratic effects of time, interactions between condition and 
linear and quadratic time, random intercepts for each participant, and random slopes for linear and quadratic time.  
As shown in Table 5, controlling for condition and its interactions with time, the quantity 
of race-related thoughts and conversations was not associated with any of the main study 
outcomes.  The one exception was that a person’s average daily rate of race-related 
                                                          
5 Some participants took multiple follow-ups in the same day, which resulted in erroneously high daily rates due to 
the short amount of elapsed time between follow-ups.  Thus, we excluded responses that occurred less than half a 
day after the last recorded follow-up from these analyses.  We did not estimate the correlations between the random 
intercepts and slopes in these models. 
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conversations was associated with smaller should-would discrepancies, b = -.088, 95% CI = [-
.174, -.001].  In contrast, the quantity of interracial interactions was more strongly associated 
with the main study outcomes.  Controlling for condition and its interactions with time, a 
person’s average level of interracial interactions was associated with smaller should-would 
discrepancies, b = -.053, 95% CI = [-.097, -.011], a relationship that was driven by lower levels 
of woulds, b = -.059, 95% CI = [-.099, -.020].  Within-person increases in the daily rate of 
interactions was associated with both change in IAT bias, b = -.044, 95% CI = [-.078, -.011], and 
increasingly strict standards for one’s race-related behavior, b = -.106, 95% CI = [-.207, -.004].  
None of the quantity variables was associated with concern. 
We also assessed whether the content of the participants’ race-related thoughts, race-
related conversations, and interracial interactions was associated with the main study outcomes.  
As a reminder, we could only assess content when the participants reported a non-zero number of 
thoughts, conversations, and interactions.  This means that we only had a sufficient number of 
responses for each person to estimate average content for each person, rather than both the 
average content and the within-person change in content.  We estimated between-person content 
by calculating the proportion of each participant’s responses that fell in each coding category. 
As shown in Table 5 and in contrast to the quantity variable results, several of the content 
variables were associated with to follow-up concern about discrimination, even controlling for 
condition and its interactions with time. A higher proportion of thought and conversation 
descriptions in which the participants themselves acted biased was associated with lower levels 
of follow-up concern, b = -1.72, 95% CI = [-2.67, -.76]. Noting the position of Black people in 
society was associated with higher concern, b = .91, 95% CI = [.12, 1.69], as was noticing others 
act with bias, b = 1.48, 95% CI = [.42, 2.53], and labeling bias as wrong, b = 1.65, 95% CI = 
[.86, 2.44]. The relationships between noticing others act with bias and labeling bias as wrong on 
the one hand and concern on the other are particularly interesting given that the habit-breaking 
changed these outcomes.  Due to ambiguity in how to estimate, in a nested design, the indirect 
effects of dichotomous mediators in the presence of variably spaced time points across 
participants, we did not conduct a formal mediation analysis.  Nevertheless, our combined results 
suggest that the habit-breaking intervention exerts its impacts on concern because it orients 
people to the behavior of others and encourages people to label behaviors as explicitly wrong. 
In addition to these relationships with concern, the proportion of descriptions in which 
the participants reported that they acted with bias was positively associated with woulds, b = .76, 
95% CI = [.12, 1.40], and the proportion of incidents that were labeled as wrong was negatively 
associated with shoulds, b = -.41, 95% CI = [-.73, -.08].  Finally, noticing patterns involving 
Black people in society was associated with stricter standards for one’s race-related behavior, b = 
-.33, 95% CI = [-.64, -.01].  There were no relationships between the content of interracial 
interactions and the main study outcomes.  
Strategy use 
Whereas the analyses above include both intervention and control participants, the 
remaining set of Phase 1 analyses include only intervention participants.  These analyses assess 
the intervention participants’ patterns of strategy use, as well as whether strategy use is 
associated with the main study outcomes. 
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Patterns of strategy use.  Participants reported using one of the strategies an average of 8.93 times (SD = 13.51) during the 
two weeks following the intervention.  Each individual strategy was used infrequently — for all five strategies, the modal amount of 
strategy use was 0, and all strategies except individuating were used less than two times on average; stereotype replacement M = 1.50, 
SD = 2.87, counterstereotypic imaging M = 1.54, SD = 2.80, individuating M = 2.46, SD = 4.52, perspective taking M = 1.85, SD = 
3.23, contact M = 1.58, SD = 3.48. 
Figure 4.  Changes over time in the daily usage of each strategy.  Envelopes indicate ±1 Wald standard error of the estimate. 
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As shown in Figure 4, total strategy use was highest at the start of the study and 
decreased daily by a factor of .881, 95% CI = [.846, .916]. This pattern of constantly decreasing 
usage was repeated across all five strategies, stereotype replacement b = .953, 95% CI = [.905, 
.999], counterstereotypic imaging b = .914, 95% CI = [.867, .960], individuating b = .953, 95% 
CI = [.915, .988], perspective taking b = .926, 95% CI = [.882, .967], contact b = .920, 95% CI = 
[.862, .972].  This pattern could either reflect an actual decrease in usage or survey fatigue, given 
that the survey solicited a description of where and when a strategy was used only if any usage 
was reported.  There were no curvilinear usage effects. None of the strategies had an average rate 
of use that was greater than .5 per day at any time during the study. 
 Relationships with the main study outcomes.  Just as with the quantities of race-
related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial interactions, both a person’s average 
rate of strategy use and the within-person change in this rate could be associated with the main 
study outcomes.  We therefore calculated, for each strategy, each person’s average daily rate of 
use, as well as the differences between a person’s occasion-specific rates and their average rate 
(Enders & Tofighi, 2007). We then fit separate models, each of which simultaneously predicted 
the IAT, concern, shoulds, woulds, and discrepancies from the between-person and within-
person indicators for use of one of the five strategies.6 
Table 6.  The relationships within the intervention condition between strategy use and the IAT, 
concern, discrepancies, and the components of discrepancies, shoulds and woulds. 
 
 
 
Note: Each strategy use variable was derived by dividing the number of uses of the strategy by the time since the last 
measurement.  We then used both each participant’s average daily rate and the differences between their occasion-
specific daily rates and this average as predictors in an LMEM, along with a random slope for the centered occasion-
specific rates.  All 95% CIs were derived using profile likelihood.  All models also contained effects of condition, 
linear and quadratic time, a random intercept for each participant, and random slopes for linear and quadratic time.  
As shown in Table 6, change in the rate of strategy use was largely unimportant for 
predicting change in the IAT, concern, shoulds, woulds, and discrepancies.  This was true 
regardless of whether we examined people’s average rate of strategy use or their changes in 
strategy use, and regardless of whether we examined each strategy individually or the total use of 
all strategies.  There were two exceptions.  First, increases in the rate of stereotype replacement 
                                                          
6 As with our other analyses using rate variables, we excluded responses that occurred less than half a day after the 
previously recorded response. 
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usage were related to increases in discrepancies, b = .283, 95% CI = [.040, .542].  This was 
driven by a negative association between stereotype replacement usage and shoulds, b = -.146, 
95% CI = [-.298, -.010].  Second, increases in the rate of counterstereotypic exemplar usage were 
related to decreases in concern about discrimination, b = -.340, 95% CI = [-.682, -.020].  It is 
possible that these two relationships indicate that adopting stricter standards for one’s interracial 
behavior leads to more frequent stereotype replacement and decreasing concern leads to more 
frequent counterstereotypic imaging.  However, it is also possible that stereotype replacement 
has a beneficial causal effect on standards, perhaps by making standards salient on a frequent 
basis, whereas counterstereotypic imaging has an ironic negative causal effect on concern, 
perhaps by highlighting examples of outgroup members who appear unaffected by 
discrimination. 
Phase 2 
Overview 
 Two years after Phase 1, we conducted an exploratory study in which we measured the 
main study outcomes from Phase 1 and three behaviors that could plausibly be affected by the 
habit-breaking intervention.  To that end, participants from Phase 1, who were kept unaware of 
the new study’s connection to Phase 1, were invited to participate in a survey about student 
engagement with issues that affect the university. They learned we were evaluating student 
interest in a potential new online section of the campus student newspaper. As part of this 
evaluation process, the participants read an essay, supposedly written by another student, that 
argued that racial stereotypes are harmless, cognitively efficient, and are unpopular only because 
of a desire to be politically correct.  Participants then had a chance to both privately rate their 
agreement with the essay and publicly post a comment about the essay’s content.  Finally, at the 
end of the study, they were given the chance to donate any amount of their compensation to a 
charity that has the mission of eliminating racial discrimination. 
As part of its emphasis on awareness, the slideshow that forms the basis of the habit-
breaking intervention specifically mentions the importance of detecting and labeling as wrong 
instances of bias in the social environment.  We therefore reasoned that, to the extent that the 
habit-breaking intervention has effects that endure, intervention participants should be more 
likely to privately disagree with the content of the essay.  If the habit-breaking intervention also 
leads people to make their views public, intervention participants may also be more likely to 
disagree with the essay publicly in their comments.  Because reading and responding to written 
pieces on blogs and social networking websites is a common experience for many, this measure 
has a close match to people’s everyday experiences.  Finally, because the habit-breaking 
intervention increases concern about racial discrimination, we reasoned that intervention 
participants may donate more to organizations aimed at eliminating this discrimination. 
Recruitment 
All 292 participants from Phase 1 were eligible for Phase 2.  We sent the participants an 
initial email to recruit them to take a survey about student engagement with issues that affect the 
university.  The recruitment email mentioned that participants would be paid $10 for their time, 
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and that they would be given the opportunity to donate any amount of this $10 to charity.  The 
email did not mention anything connected to Phase 1. 
After the initial recruitment email, we made strenuous efforts to obtain a high response 
rate; specifically, we sent two subsequent reminder emails and, if we had a cell phone number 
for our participants from Phase 1, we made a personal appeal to participate by cell phone.  Of the 
292 participants from Phase 1, 108 (42 intervention, 66 control, 74% female, 73% White, 19% 
Asian) consented to Phase 2, yielding a 37% response rate.  Of the 108 consenting participants, 
77 (71%) completed the survey, and 39 (36%) completed an IAT to which the participants were 
redirected after the completion of the survey.  On average, participants started Phase 2 two years 
(M = 786 days, SD = 76 days) after they started Phase 1. 
 Assuming an effect size typical of social psychology (r = .21; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-
Zoota, 2003), our sample of 77 yields 46% power to detect an effect of the habit-breaking 
intervention on one of our behavioral measures.  If we instead assume an effect size closer to the 
ones obtained by Devine and colleagues (2012) on the IAT (r = .28), concern (r = .22), and 
discrepancies (r = .22), our power ranges from 51% to 71%.  Phase 2 is therefore somewhat 
underpowered, meaning that significance tests in Phase 2 cannot distinguish between effects that 
are small and effects that are non-existent.  Moreover, any effects that we do detect may be 
overestimates (Button et al., 2013).  Despite these limitations, we believe the rarity of long-lag 
data on the effectiveness of bias interventions make these data worth examining. 
Procedure 
         All materials and data are publicly available at https://osf.io/a3c8h/.  Participants were 
informed that the study was testing a new online section of the campus student newspaper, called 
“Dialogue,” that would feature a weekly essay from a student on a topic of importance to the 
campus community. Students reading the “Dialogue” section would have the chance to discuss 
the essay in a comments section below the essay. 
         The participants were then asked to read a sample essay for the dialogue section entitled 
“Racial stereotypes are useful tools” that argued that stereotypes are useful for bypassing the 
effortful process of treating all people as individuals. The essay further argued that stereotyping 
has only become “untrendy” because our society is too politically correct and that stereotypes are 
harmless. 
         After reading the essay, participants commented on the essay, reported whether they 
agreed with the essay, and completed the survey measures from Phase 1.  These survey measures 
included concern, shoulds, and woulds, as well as the measures only measured at baseline, 
namely IMS, EMS, and attitudes toward Black people. At the end of the survey, participants 
were asked whether they would like to donate any or all of their earnings to any of 4 potential 
charities, including a charity that had the goal of reducing racial discrimination. Following the 
donation measure, participants completed the IAT. 
         Essay agreement. The participants were asked to rate their agreement with seven 
statements using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.  They were assured that 
these ratings would remain confidential.  Six of these statements were filler items designed to 
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enhance the cover story (e.g., “I think students will use this website”, “I would be interested in 
writing essays for this section of the paper”), whereas one of the items was the item of interest 
(“I agreed with the author’s main points”). 
         Essay comments. The participants were asked to post a comment in response to the 
essay, which they were told would go live with the essay if and when the “Dialogue” section was 
added to the student newspaper. Two independent coders categorized each comment according 
to whether it expressed disagreement with the content of the essay (59.5%), was neutral toward 
the content of the essay (17.7%) or expressed an opinion that was mixed (22.8%).  No 
commenter expressed unreserved agreement with the essay. A sample disagreeing comment is: 
Although I see the point you are trying to make about how stereotyping can be a useful 
tool, I completely disagree that stereotypes give a good indication of what any particular 
person will be like. Outward appearances very rarely reflect the true depth of any 
individual, and often times these stereotypes are built around themes we've seen in the 
media. Also, the idea that a stereotype is not going to affect how you act toward a person 
has been proven wrong through many different scientific experiments that have found 
that stereotypes highly influence our actions towards others. 
A sample neutral comment is: 
This opinion would get quite a response from the ethnic based student organizations and 
advocacy groups. It is definitely a way to get people talking, but it could really start a 
negative reaction towards the Badger Herald. 
A sample mixed comment is: 
I thought it was ignorant at first but believe the reasoning behind stereotypes is very true, 
not necessarily saying it’s a good thing or bad thing 
We combined the neutral and mixed categories for the purposes of analysis. 
         Donations. The participants were given the opportunity to donate any amount of their 
compensation (including $0) to each of four charities. The participants were given short 
descriptions of the goals of each charity and links to the charity websites. One of the charities, 
the Center for Social Inclusion, has the goal to eliminate racial discrimination in policies 
affecting transportation, food, and housing opportunities for people of color. The other three 
charities, the World Wildlife Fund, the American Red Cross, and the Make a Wish Foundation, 
were included to enhance the cover story. The dependent variable of interest was the dollar 
amount of donations to the Center of Social Inclusion. 
Phase 1 outcomes.  We measured the main outcomes from Phase 1, namely implicit bias, 
concern, and should-would discrepancies.  We also measured the outcomes that were measured 
at baseline but not the Phase 1 follow-ups, namely racial attitudes and the motivations to respond 
without prejudice.  The IAT was the last measure we administered in the survey.  Due to 
limitations in the survey software, the participants had to be redirected to a separate website, 
where they were prompted to download a plugin required to administer the IAT.  Presumably 
because taking the IAT involved extra effort, only 39 participants completed it. 
Running head: HABIT-BREAKING MECHANISMS                  5 
 
Results 
 As shown in Table 7, participants who consented to Phase 2 were equivalent in their 
baseline characteristics.  For all variables except comments, we estimated the difference between 
the intervention and control participants using a General Linear Model.  For comments, we used 
a Generalized Linear Model with a logit link from the binomial family.  If the outcome measure 
in question was measured at baseline in Phase 1, we used the baseline measurement as a 
covariate to increase power (Van Breukelen, 2006). 
Table 7.  Comparisons between the intervention and control conditions among the consenting 
participants for Phase 2. 
 
 
 
Note: For the baseline variables, the “Difference” column shows the mean difference between the intervention and 
control participants and its 95% CI.  For the follow-up variables, the “Difference” column shows the difference and 
95% CI, controlling for the baseline measurement of the variable in question (if the variable was measured at 
baseline).  For the disagreeing comments variable, this difference is an odds ratio rather than a mean difference. 
Longevity of change in Phase 1 outcomes. As shown in Table 7, there was modest 
evidence that intervention participants had greater reported woulds than control participants, b = 
.499, 95% CI = [-.003, 1.001], though the 95% CI for this difference overlapped slightly with 0.  
There was no evidence of any other differences between the Phase 1 outcomes, though the 
descriptive difference in concern (intervention M = 7.39, SD = 1.64; control M = 6.72, SD = 
2.53) was in the predicted direction.  Our somewhat low power means that it is ambiguous 
whether the difference in concern that we observed in Phase 1 has faded by Phase 2 or if our 
sample is simply too small to detect an enduring difference.  
Behavioral measures. Both intervention and control participants disagreed privately 
with the essay’s content; rated agreement in both groups was well below the scale midpoint of 4 
(M = 2.48, SD = 1.65).  There was no evidence that the degree of private disagreement differed 
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by condition, intervention M = 2.10, SD = 1.12, control M = 2.71, SD = 1.86, Mdiff = .61, 95% CI 
= [-.13, 1.36].  However, there was evidence that intervention participants were more likely to 
post a public comment disagreeing with the premise that stereotypes were harmless.  Whereas 
48% of control participants wrote a disagreeing comment, 79% of intervention participants wrote 
one, OR = 4.15, 95% CI = [1.51, 12.84].  Only 25 participants chose to donate any amount to the 
Center for Social Inclusion, and the amount donated did not differ by condition, intervention M = 
$1.10, SD = $2.26, control M = $1.06, SD = $2.06, Mdiff = $0.04, 95% CI = [$-0.93, $1.02] 
General Discussion 
 Consistent with the results reported by Devine and colleagues (2012), we found that the 
habit-breaking intervention produced an enduring impact on concern about discrimination. 
Although the present study replicated the intervention’s effect on concern, its results related to 
should-would discrepancies and the IAT were not fully consistent with those reported by Devine 
and colleagues. Devine and colleagues found that the habit-breaking intervention produced an 
enduring increase in discrepancies by increasing woulds, whereas we found that the initial 
increase in woulds declined back to baseline in the latter part of the study. In addition, Devine 
and colleagues found that only intervention participants declined in their IAT scores, whereas we 
found that both intervention and control participants exhibited this decrease. 
Extending the original work, we found that in the two weeks following the manipulation, 
intervention participants were more likely to (1) notice bias in the world around them, (2) label 
any bias (in themselves, others, or society) as wrong, and (3) have interracial interactions with 
relative strangers (as opposed to friends and family). Two years later, intervention participants 
were more likely to confront bias by writing comments disagreeing with an essay advocating 
stereotyping. We believe that, despite some ambiguities in our findings, they provide compelling 
evidence that the prejudice habit-breaking intervention causes its recipients to recognize bias and 
its consequences for minorities, then address it in the world around them.  
Replication inconsistencies 
 The present study has a much larger sample size than the study reported by Devine and 
colleagues.  This means that, as long as the present study is a fair test of the effects of the habit-
breaking intervention, it is more likely that the effects on implicit bias and discrepancies reported 
by Devine and colleagues are false positives than that the present results are false negatives.  
However, the six differences in procedure outlined in Table 1 complicate this interpretation – the 
new procedural elements in the present study may have masked the habit-breaking intervention’s 
true effects.  Of these differences, we believe those most likely to interfere are the changes to the 
follow-up administration schedule.  For example, the frequent assessment schedule may have 
focused the participants’ attention on race-related issues, which could have interfered with the 
effect of the intervention on should-would discrepancies.  After the initial spike in discrepancies, 
intervention participants may have either worked to reduce their biases or compared their own 
behavior to the new biases that they observed in other people, either of which may have caused 
them to revise their beliefs about their biases back to their baseline levels. As another example, 
the high frequency of IAT administration could have given participants sufficient practice to 
“beat” the IAT (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Kim, 2003; Steffens, 2004; Lai et al., 2014). If 
these practice effects are not additive with the habit-breaking intervention’s true effects, they 
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could result in similar decreases in IAT scores in both the control and the intervention 
conditions, which would mask a true non-zero effect of the intervention on implicit bias. 
Ultimately, the precise reasons for the differences between our findings and those 
reported by Devine and colleagues (2012) are ambiguous.  Regardless, we replicated the original 
effect of the habit-breaking intervention on concern, which gives us confidence that this effect is 
robust.  The habit-breaking intervention’s impact on concern amounted to an estimated 
difference of .42 scale units at the end of the 14-day period of Phase 1.  Until we obtain 
population-level evidence about the typical distribution of concern in representative samples, the 
pragmatic importance of a difference this size is unclear.  However, as we will describe in more 
detail below, both our mechanism analyses and general theory about the self suggest that 
producing change in concern may have considerable theoretical importance to the bias reducing 
process.  As we will argue, this theoretical importance may eclipse that of implicit bias. 
The habit-breaking intervention’s mechanisms of change 
 Our analyses of reported strategy use and the quantity of race-related thoughts, race-
related conversations, and interracial interactions suggest that none of these is likely responsible 
for producing the intervention’s effects.  The habit-breaking intervention does not change these 
variables, and with the exception of the quantity of interracial interactions, few of these variables 
were associated with implicit bias, concern, or discrepancies.  In contrast, three dimensions of 
the content of race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, and interracial interactions 
differed as a function of the intervention. Participants who completed the habit-breaking 
intervention were slightly more likely to mention spending time with unfamiliar Black people. 
Intervention participants were also more likely to mention instances in which others acted with 
bias and more likely to label any biases they observed (in themselves, others, or society) as 
wrong.  
In particular, noticing the biases of others and labeling biases as wrong were both 
associated with follow-up concern, even controlling for the intervention’s effects.  These results 
suggest that noticing the biases of others and labeling biases as wrong serve as mechanisms 
through which the habit-breaking intervention increases the degree to which people think 
discrimination is a problem.  If increased concern provokes people to pay more attention to 
biases in the external environment, concern could be implicated in a recursive, self-sustaining 
process.  A recursive relationship between concern and sensitivity to bias in the external 
environment could be one reason for the persistence of the intervention’s effects.  If true, these 
speculations suggest a potential means through which researchers and practitioners could further 
enhance the intervention’s effectiveness: encourage people to attend to the biases of others in 
their daily life. 
Overall, our results suggest that the habit-breaking intervention does not primarily exert 
its effects through the strategies the participants learn, nor does it exert its effects by changing 
the raw quantity of race-related thoughts, race-related conversations, or interracial interactions.  
Instead, the habit-breaking intervention increases people’s sensitivity to bias, particularly when 
others act with bias, and increases the probability that, when a person encounters bias, he or she 
will label that bias as wrong.  The process of detecting bias in others and labeling it as wrong 
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may in turn provoke concern about racial discrimination, just as the concern may itself provoke 
the detection of future bias. 
The habit-breaking intervention and long-term change 
 Finally, we uncovered evidence that some of the impact of the habit-breaking 
intervention is truly long-lasting.  Intervention participants were more likely than control 
participants to publicly object to an essay arguing that stereotypes are useful two years after the 
administration of the intervention.  It is noteworthy that the process of identifying the biased 
behavior in another person, labeling it as such, and speaking out about it in a public forum is 
quite similar to the processes that we uncovered in the content of participants’ race-related 
thoughts and conversations from Phase 1.  In this sense, the commenting measure provides a 
good match with the processes that underlie the habit-breaking intervention effects, and the 
difference in objecting comments at Phase 2 suggests that these processes persisted two years 
after the intervention was administered.  However, we temper this interpretation by noting that 
our Phase 2 sample was somewhat small, and the true effect of the habit-breaking intervention on 
the tendency to object to biases may therefore be somewhat smaller than we report here (Button 
et al., 2013).  Nevertheless, we believe the Phase 2 data provide tentative, encouraging evidence 
as to the longevity of the habit-breaking intervention’s effects. 
Why do the effects of the habit-breaking intervention persist?  One compelling account 
stems from Rokeach’s theory of the self (Rokeach, 1973).  This theory holds that behavior is 
governed by a self-system that is arranged hierarchically around a person’s self-concept 
(Rokeach, 1973).  All aspects of the self are affected to some degree by the social environment.  
However, the aspects that are most central to the self-concept, such as values, are highly resistant 
to environmentally induced change precisely because such changes require the reorganization of 
other components lower in the hierarchy.  By the same token, the more peripheral aspects of the 
self, such as stereotypic associations, are highly susceptible to environmental influence because 
they require no such reorganization (Forscher, Lai et al., under review).7 
Rokeach’s theory offers a useful lens for thinking about psychological change processes.  
From the perspective of a person designing an intervention, the decision as to whether to target 
processes central or peripheral to the self-concept offers a tradeoff.  Centrally located processes 
(e.g., values) may be more difficult to change initially, but once initiated, a change can spur a 
large-scale reorganization of the self-system (Rokeach, 1973).  Supported by the newly 
restructured self-system, the change is also likely to endure despite possibly countervailing 
environmental influences.  In contrast, peripheral processes (e.g., stereotypic associations) are 
highly susceptible to intervention, at least in the short term.  However, because these changes are 
not buffered by a newly reorganized self-system, they are more likely to be erased by 
countervailing environmental influences with the passage of time (Lai et al., 2016). 
                                                          
7 Rokeach’s theory is not fully consistent with modern, connectionist views of cognition (see Cox & Devine, 2015; 
McClelland et al., 2010). A modern connectionist view of cognition might replace the Rokeach’s construct of 
centrality to the self-concept with the construct of the density of the connections between different aspects of the 
self-structure network.  Regardless of which construct one uses, the implications for change processes are similar, so 
we maintain the “centrality” terminology for ease of communication. 
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If we apply this analysis to the habit-breaking intervention, we see that the primary 
targets of change are not the processes that are central to the self-concept.  Indeed, in both the 
data presented by Devine and colleagues (2012) and in our Phase 2 data, the internal motivation 
to respond without prejudice, which stems from a person’s core egalitarian values, did not 
change as a function of the intervention.  Likewise, the habit-breaking intervention does not 
directly target automatic processes like implicit bias.  Rather, the primary targets of change are 
beliefs or knowledge – knowledge about how biases can affect behavior unintentionally, whether 
one’s own behavior is or could be biased, and whether the unintentionally biased behavior has 
adverse consequences.  Knowledge is more central to the self-concept than are automatic 
associations, but less central than values.  Knowledge may therefore be an effective target for 
intervention – it is flexible enough to be influenced by new information and central enough to the 
self-concept to support the continuation of intervention-initiated changes.  
Changing processes that are central to the self may be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for producing enduring change.  For truly long-term change, it may be necessary for a 
person to establish patterns of behavior that support the newly changed psychological processes 
(Miller, Dannals, & Zlatev, in press; Yeager & Walton, 2011).  In this sense, the habit-breaking 
intervention’s effects on people’s tendencies to notice and label bias may have been critical for 
the intervention’s persistence because these behaviors may have created a feedback loop with 
people’s increased concern about discrimination – an increased tendency to notice and label the 
biases of others should lead to increased concern, and increased concern should also lead to 
noticing and labeling the biases of others. 
An important implication of this analysis is that the processes that lead to the persistence 
of an intervention’s effects are unlikely to be captured by conventional, widely-used implicit 
measures.  Unintentional bias is a broad construct caused by a range of affective, motivational, 
cognitive, and behavioral processes, and responses on implicit measures only tap a small range 
of these processes.  According to our analysis, these processes are also the ones least likely to 
support long-term intervention-initiated changes because they are not central to the self-concept.  
It may be time for intervention researchers to look beyond implicit measures by crafting 
interventions that target more central psychological processes and by evaluating the effectiveness 
of these interventions with longitudinal assessments of behaviors that that contribute to recursive 
feedback loops. 
Conclusion 
 Evidence-based interventions are needed to overcome psychological biases. The 
prejudice habit-breaking intervention remains a highly promising candidate for empowering 
people to reduce their own biases through awareness, concern, and effort. Although we did not 
replicate the habit-breaking intervention’s effects on IAT scores, we did partially replicate its 
effects on discrepancies and fully replicate its effects on concern about discrimination. 
Moreover, change in concern seems to be both persistent and associated with change in a broad 
range of psychological processes related to one’s orientation toward oneself and the social 
environment. Intervention participants were more likely to interact with Black strangers, were 
more likely to report noticing bias and to label it as wrong, and, two years later, were more likely 
to confront bias in others. Taken together, we believe this study represents promising evidence 
for the habit-breaking intervention’s effectiveness in producing lasting psychological change.  
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